In Bosnia and Herzegovina, international sanction measures have been imposed against natural persons by countries such as the United Kingdom, and the United States. Sanctioned individuals, ranging from the current political actors to ex-officials, have been restricted through asset freezing and travel bans. Interestingly, while the European Union has maintained a framework for restrictive measures concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina since 2011, this framework has never been activated to sanction any individuals. Despite being in place for over a decade, it remains unused. This raises a few important points to settle: why were these measures established in the first place, and how do they contribute to the long-term implications for Bosnia and Herzegovina in terms of European integration?
The Sanctions
BiH individual sanctions revolve around the Dayton Peace Agreement, targeting persons who undermine the agreement through actions such as corruption, destabilization, and threats to the constitutional order or territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. To that effect, the US Department of State has levied several sanctions in the Western Balkans, prohibiting individuals from contributing or provision of goods, funds, and services within the United States. Despite this, the amount of control that the sanctions can impose is very limited: for example, if the US desires to stop a political actor from embezzling and freezes their assets in the States, there is no effect if the actor continues to embezzle from BiH itself. Worse still, if assets are frozen, there is still no stopping the individual actors from embezzling US-contributed funds to the state – creating an impasse. Regardless, the US has continued sanctioning individual actors since 2021: with one of the most frequently mentioned actors being Milorad Dodik.
Designated Actor – Milorad Dodik
Certain individuals have been designated by sanctions far more than others such as M. Dodik, president of Republika Srpska. He has been a designated target of US sanctions since 2022, with sanctions being extended to his family network, such as his son Igor Dodik, and associated companies – cutting off businesses worth in total around 250 million euros. This not only harms the businesses directly, but puts any organizations or individuals in association under threat of sanction as a form of deterrence. In turn, Dodik has encouraged the implementation of legislation in RS specifically meant to serve as a workaround for US-led sanctions, to limited effect. Despite the extensive range of US-led sanctions imposed against Dodik and other actors, such as M. Čavara, D. Kajmaković, and more, it is mostly quiet on the EU side of things. Why, especially when Bosnia and Herzegovina is in the EU’s backyard?
EU Restrictive Framework
As it stands right now, there are no individual actors who have been travel banned or restricted under the EU framework – so why extend a restrictive measure, when there is no ability to utilize it? The framework was introduced to support and protect the Dayton Peace Agreement after several legal and political actions that threatened state-level laws, competencies and institutions, ‘inflammatory rhetoric’ and lack of progress against corruption, particularly when related to high level political actors. The main dimensions of the framework operate through sanctions via asset freezing, travel bans to the EU and the prohibition of making funds available for natural persons. However, despite the framework’s thirteen years of being in effect, it has little recognizable impact on all aforementioned spheres. Member states have pointed to the violation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s basic constitutional order by RS legislation, stating that actors such as Dodik and other RS officials must finally be sanctioned. Even still, sanction discussions by the EU have been largely unsettled, leaving the framework’s abilities in total limbo. In turn, EU imposed sanctions on Dodik and potentially other actors have yet to come to fruition, either delayed or blocked by member states allied with RS, such as Hungary. If there is no result of EU mechanisms, should they be in place? And if they did function properly, what positive effect would they have on the state of destabilization and corruption in BiH, when these issues are still alive and well despite US efforts?
The EU finds itself between a rock and a hard place: the choice seems to be between attempting and failing to sanction problematic individuals, or retracting completely. This is likely why they have continued to extend the duration of the framework, despite internal issues: after BiH received candidacy, there is more to be lost than to be gained by removing themselves from the equation. The goal is still, inevitably, to promote European integration in the region.
Why the Sanctions Aren’t Working as They Should?
Sanctions are not without precedent – comparing the rest of the Balkans to Bosnia, the US has taken similar measures in North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, and Serbia to counteract corruption. Other than threatening sanctions in North Macedonia, there has been no activity from the side of the EU. Partly, there is the issue of internal agreement within the Council that decides on the actions of the restrictive framework: evidently, there is a lack of consensus or action by decision makers This failure to act undermines the intended purpose of these sanctions. Instead of isolating disruptive political figures, such as those in Republika Srpska, the sanctions have inadvertently pushed them to seek alliances with adversarial powers, notably Russia. This shift not only counteracts the EU and US efforts but also deepens BiH's internal divisions, amplifying resentment against the West. The increasing polarization, as evidenced by US criticisms of Milorad Dodik’s obstruction of EU integration, suggests that the sanctions may be doing more harm than good. Rather than advancing BiH's integration into the EU, these measures risk entrenching resistance and fostering closer ties with anti-Western entities, thereby weakening the overall effectiveness of the EU integration process.
